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Jurisprudence and the
Problem of Church Doctrine

M

by Nathan B. Oman

ormons frequently refer to “Church Doctrine” in their
theological discussions. For example, Sister Smith might express
her belief that the earth is no more than ﬁve or six thousand
years old and that the theory of evolution is a Satanically inspired plot.
Brother Young responds by noting, “Those are just your opinions. That
is not Church Doctrine.” Whatever else the term Church Doctrine
might mean in this exchange, it is clearly functioning as a theological
authority, delineating those beliefs that have a claim on Brother Young
from those that do not. Like most Mormons, Brother Young seems to be
conceptualizing Church Doctrine as some set of authoritative teachings
promulgated by the Church1 that it is possible to identify. Yet how we
differentiate between Church Doctrine and mere opinion is unclear. I
argue that we can analogize the problem of “What is Church Doctrine?”
to the jurisprudential problem of “What is the law?” The answers offered
by the philosophy of law to the second of these questions illuminates the
sorts of answers that we can give to the ﬁrst. Ultimately, I conclude that
we discover Church Doctrine not by application of any hard and fast rule
that allows us to identify it but rather through a process of interpretation.
This approach to Church Doctrine, in turn, throws new light on two
persistent issues in Mormon thought: the relationship between authority
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and independent moral judgment, and the way in which Mormons
interpret their own past.
Consider the example of the Roman Catholic Church. Like the Church,
Roman Catholicism has an integrated ecclesiastical structure with a strong
emphasis on authority. Were one interested in the “Church Doctrine”
of Roman Catholicism, one would consult the Catechism of the Catholic
Church. This is a volume of 864 pages promulgated in 1992 by Pope John
Paul II which sets forth the ofﬁcial doctrine of Roman Catholicism.2 The
Church has no analogous volume. In the nineteenth century, John Jacques
attempted to synthesize Church Doctrine into a Mormon catechism, but
his work did not survive and has garnered few imitators in the century or
more since it was published.3 More recently, Elder Bruce R. McConkie
attempted a complete synthesis of Church Doctrine in his book Mormon
Doctrine, but the only thing that seems clear about the doctrinal status of
that work is that it is not ofﬁcial Church Doctrine.4
In an age of correlation, we seem to have an easy solution to the
problem of what is Church Doctrine. Church Doctrine is simply whatever
is published by the Church, perhaps subject to the caveat that it has been
properly correlated. Let’s call this the correlation argument. This is where
our ﬁrst analogy from the philosophy of law appears. During the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth-century a group of American thinkers known as the
legal realists adopted a similarly functional answer to the question, “what
is the law?” As one representative scholar in the movement wrote:
[D]oing something about disputes . . . is the business of law. And
the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or
sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are ofﬁcials of the law. What
these ofﬁcials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.5
Hopefully the analogy to the correlation argument is clear. Just as in the
realist view law is simply what the judges do, in the correlation argument
Church Doctrine is simply what correlation says. The correlation argument,
however, suffers from precisely the same problem as the realist conception
of law. One cannot say that the law is simply what the judges do, because
the judges themselves look up the law and try to follow it in rendering
their decisions. Accordingly, law as what the judges do runs into a hopeless
problem of circularity. The problem with the correlation argument – and
with most other arguments that seek to identify Church Doctrine as
2
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simply “what X person says” – is that those on the correlation committees
(and others who speak for the Church) look to Church Doctrine as the
governing standard of what they are doing. In other words, in the best of
all possible worlds correlated Church statements are not Church Doctrine
because they are correlated. Rather they are correlated to conform with
Church Doctrine. This assumes, however, that Church Doctrine exists as
some body of identiﬁable, authoritative teachings independent of correlation
or whoever else is expounding it. My point is not that Church Doctrine doesn’t
exist or that it somehow lacks authority. Nor is my point even that we
are incapable of identifying clear instances of Church Doctrine. The
claims that Jesus Christ is the savior of mankind and that good Latterday Saints should not drink coffee are both uncontroversial instances of
Church Doctrine. My point is that identifying the full contours of Church
Doctrine presents a puzzle; a puzzle that legal philosophy can assist us in
untangling.
JURISPRUDENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
CHURCH DOCTRINE

J

urists and political philosophers tend to ask different questions about
the law. Political philosophers are largely concerned with justiﬁcation.
They tend to assume that the question of what the law is is relatively
simple, and they want to spend their time thinking about what sorts of
laws are justiﬁed. Jurists, in contrast, know from experience that the
contours of the law are frequently unclear and determining what the law
is can be as difﬁcult as determining whether it is justiﬁed. Ultimately, the
jurists’ questions are of more use for thinking about how we discover
Church Doctrine than the political philosophers’ questions. This is
because rather than seeking to determine the extent to which the law’s
authority is justiﬁed, the jurists seek to determine how far the law’s claim
of authority extends. It is this focus on form over substance that makes
the juristic arguments useful for thinking about Church Doctrine. This
is because the question of how we identify Church Doctrine is a formal
question rather than a substantive question. We are not interested in what
Church Doctrine ought to be but rather in what it actually is. Consider
analogies to three jurisprudential theories: natural law, legal positivism,
and law as integrity.
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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The idea of natural law makes its entrance into legal philosophy in
the work of the ancient Stoics, and since that time the term has followed
so many twists and turns and taken on so many different meanings and
nuances that it is dangerous to speak of the natural law account of the
law. Forced to hazard a brief deﬁnition, however, I think that the core
of natural law can be stated as the claim that law is deﬁned in terms of
what is actually morally justiﬁed. Perhaps more importantly, natural law
involves a very strong negative claim, namely that a command or rule that
is immoral, no matter how ofﬁcial looking, is not law. Sufﬁce it to say that
this is a gross over-simpliﬁcation, and that natural law does not simply
identify law and morality. Natural law thinkers acknowledge that law has
certain social and institutional aspects – for example enforcement – but
what they deny is that it can be deﬁned purely by reference to its social
aspect.
What would an analogous theory of Church Doctrine look like?
Joseph Smith once declared, “One of the grand fundamental principles
of ‘Mormonism’ is to receive truth let it come from whence it may,”6
and Brigham Young taught, “‘Mormonism’ embraces all truth that is
revealed and that is unrevealed, whether religious, political, scientiﬁc, or
philosophical.”7 Brigham, I take it, is making a claim about the contours
of Mormonism properly understood, rather than about the status of the
society of Deseret in the nineteenth century (or the society of the Wasatch
Front in the twenty-ﬁrst century, for that matter). Mormonism, on this
view, is co-extensive with truth. Applying this notion to Church Doctrine,
we would say that Church Doctrine is that which is true. In other words,
truth acts as our criteria for identifying Church Doctrine. Just as natural
law identiﬁes law with morality, a natural law approach to the question
of what is Church Doctrine identiﬁes it with truth. There is an appealing
audacity and expansiveness to this approach, but unfortunately it suffers
from some basic problems.
Saying that Church Doctrine is simply coextensive with what is true
cannot make sense of some very basic ways in which the concept is used.
Consider, once more Sister Smith’s claims about the age of the earth.
Imagine that Brother Young’s reaction – “That is just your opinion. It is
not Church Doctrine” – is prompted by the fact that he is uncertain about
the age of the earth. There would be nothing shocking about Brother
Young’s invocation of Church Doctrine in such a situation. Faced with a
doubtful situation, he is using Church Doctrine to conﬁrm the legitimacy
4
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of his doubt. He is not required by its authority to assent to Sister Smith’s
position. Furthermore, it is precisely because Brother Young seems to
know the contours of Church Doctrine that he knows that he is under no
obligation to accept Sister Smith’s claims. Yet if Church Doctrine were
truth, in identifying its contours he would necessarily have laid to rest any
doubts as to Sister Smith’s position. Indeed, placing it outside of Church
Doctrine would be tantamount to claiming that it was false. Yet this is
precisely what our doubtful Brother Young refuses to do.
The problem of Church Doctrine as truth is further undermined if we
believe – as I think we are required to do – that there are issues about which
Church Doctrine is silent. For example, I take it to be fairly uncontroversial
that there is no Church Doctrine on the precise location of Williamsburg,
Virginia. Somewhat more controversially, one can plausibly (and correctly
in my view) claim that there is no Church Doctrine on the truth or falsity
of the theory of evolution.8 No one could plausibly argue, however, that
because of this, no statement about the location of Williamsburg, Virginia
(or the theory of evolution) could be true or false. The statement that
“Williamsburg, Virginia is located on the banks of the Potomac River” is
clearly false, the silence of Church Doctrine notwithstanding. Nor does
it make sense of our ordinary usage of the term Church Doctrine to say,
“It is Church Doctrine that Williamsburg, Virginia is on the York-James
Peninsula.” One might try to save the Church Doctrine as truth approach
by reﬁning it somewhat, saying that Church Doctrine is any truth that is
taught by or in the Church. The reﬁnement runs into two problems. First,
it leaves unanswered the difﬁcult question of what constitutes teaching by
the Church (more on this below). Second, it still doesn’t capture the way
in which the concept of Church Doctrine is used. An example illustrates
both points. Suppose that I am called as gospel doctrine teacher in my
ward. I then begin teaching in class that Williamsburg, Virginia is located
on the York-James Peninsula, including in my lesson a detailed discussion
of the geography of the Virginia tidewater. My bishop then instructs me
to stop, telling me that I should conﬁne my teaching to Church Doctrine.
Clearly his instructions do not do any violence to the ordinary usage of
Church Doctrine, even though there is nothing false about my teachings.
They do suggest, however, that Church Doctrine cannot be understood
as any truth that is taught in the context of the Church.
Legal positivism provides a second possible analogy for Church
Doctrine. According to H.L.A. Hart, an inﬂuential legal positivist, law is a
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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system of rules. Some rules govern human behavior, for example the rule
that murder is prohibited. Some rules govern the promulgation and validity
of other rules. On this view, law is ultimately deﬁned by what Hart called
a “rule of recognition.” 9 This is a rule that allows us to differentiate those
rules that are law from other rules, such as rules of manners or the rules
of golf, which are not law. For example, in the United Kingdom a statute
passed by the House of Commons is law. This is a rule of recognition.
Positivism provides a seemingly elegant solution to the problem of
what is Church Doctrine. All that is necessary is to identify a rule of
recognition for Church Doctrine. The problem is that as a matter of social
understanding it does not appear that any such rule of recognition exists. It
is tempting to look to the scriptures and the idea of canonization as a rule
of recognition. On this view, Church Doctrine would consist of whatever
the scriptures say. There are at least two problems with this approach.
First, it is over- and under-inclusive. There are certain things that are very
clearly Church Doctrine that cannot really be found in the scriptures. For
example, our current understanding of the Word of Wisdom exceeds
the text of the Doctrine & Covenants. The very fact that the Word of
Wisdom is regarded today as a commandment is at odds with the text
itself, which clearly states that it is not given by way of commandment
(see D&C 89:2). The scriptures also contain many teachings that are not
Church Doctrine. For example, certain aspects of the text of the Word
of Wisdom – such as the prohibition on meat except in winter or time
of famine – are not regarded as normative (see D&C 89:12-13). Likewise,
Christ’s prohibition on divorce in the Gospel of Mark does not seem to
be Church Doctrine (see Mark 10:6-9), to say nothing of the intricate
rules found in the Pentateuch.
The second problem with looking only to the scriptures for Church
Doctrine is the problem of interpretation. Mormonism begins with a
rejection of the sufﬁciency of scriptural interpretation standing alone.
After ﬁnding himself caught up in a war of words between the rival
evangelists in Palmyra, Joseph Smith noted that “the teachers of religion
of the different sects understood the same passages of scripture so
differently as to destroy all conﬁdence in settling the question by an appeal to the Bible”
(JS-H 1:11-12; emphasis added). The new revelation of the Restoration
came only after the sufﬁciency of scripture had been rejected. As it now
stands, Mormons regularly invoke the concept of Church Doctrine as an
aid to the interpretation of scripture. For example, should someone teach
6

Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)

Nathan B. Oman
that the text of D&C 89 requires that Mormons become vegetarians; the
standard response would be, “That is just your interpretation; it is not
Church Doctrine.” This points, however, to an important function of
Church Doctrine. It is something that we frequently use to identify which
interpretations of scripture are authoritative and which are not. This
means, however, that Church Doctrine necessarily exceeds the Standard
Works standing alone.
Finally, one might look to the statements of General Authorities as
providing a clear rule of recognition for Church Doctrine. Joseph Smith,
however, insisted that a prophet is only a prophet when speaking as a
prophet. What we lack, however, is a clear criterion for identifying when
a prophet is speaking as a prophet. For example, should we assume that
everything uttered in general conference is Church Doctrine? If so, is
it because the speakers in general conference are careful to make sure
that they don’t say anything that contradicts Church Doctrine, or because
Church Doctrine simply is what is said in general conference? Furthermore,
is Church Doctrine conﬁned to some set of public statements by high
Church leaders? For example, if the General Handbook of Instructions
were modiﬁed so that abstinence from coffee was no longer necessary to
qualify as worthy for a temple recommend, would such a change constitute
a shift in Church Doctrine, even if it was not announced from the pulpit
in general conference? The fact that we do not have clear answers to
these questions suggests to me that we lack a clear rule of recognition
for what constitutes Church Doctrine. This does not mean, of course,
that the words of scripture and modern prophets are without authority.
It simply means that a statement does not become Church Doctrine by
virtue of being uttered by any particular Church leader or even by virtue
of being printed in the Standard Works. Nor does it mean that the various
potential rules of recognition that we might propose are wrong per se. All
of these rules can help to orient us toward Church Doctrine. However,
they cannot provide a fool-proof way of identifying Church Doctrine in
every case.
LAW AS INTEGRITY AND CHURCH DOCTRINE

“L

aw as integrity” provides an attractive alternative to the analogy
of legal positivism. This approach begins with so-called “easy
cases,” situations where what the law consists of and what it demands
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is more or less clear and obvious. For example, we know that the U.S.
Constitution’s requirement that the President be at least 35 years of age
can be identiﬁed as the law without recourse to any elaborate theory of
what law is. Such obviously true legal propositions abound: Lower courts
are bound to apply the holdings of higher courts; the 1964 Civil Rights
Act clearly forbids a Hilton from refusing to serve a patron because he
or she is Black; after centuries of accumulated precedent many commonlaw rules, like the requirement that a will have two witnesses, are beyond
serious question. The vast majority of legal disputes involve such “easy
cases.” We only require a theory of “what is the law?” when we are faced
with what Ronald Dworkin has called “hard cases.”10 In these situations
the scope of the law is unclear and we are hard pressed to identify its
demands. Dworkin imagines how a perfect judge, who he names Hercules,
would decide such a case.11 According to Dworkin, Hercules would survey
the vast mass of clear and easy law relating to the issue. He would then
construct an account that makes sense of all of this material. Any theory
of law must do this because the clear and easy law is binding, hence his
interpretation must ﬁt and justify it.
Dworkin gives the example of the English case of McLaughlin v.
O’Brian.12 The case involved a woman who sued a negligent driver for
damages for emotional distress. The woman was not in the car accident
and had not been physically injured in any way. Rather, she was called to
the hospital where she learned that her husband and daughter had been
killed. Previous English cases had awarded damages for emotional distress
but only in cases where the plaintiff had actually witnessed the injury
or had come upon a loved one’s corpse at the scene of the accident.13
The question presented by McLaughlin was whether or not these cases
authorized damages in a situation where emotional distress was removed
from the scene of the accident to the more antiseptic setting of the
hospital.
In deciding a case like McLaughlin, Hercules does not simply decide
whether he believes, all things considered, that recovery for emotional
distress in this situation is a good idea. Rather he begins with the earlier
cases. Suppose, for example, that Hercules believes that any recovery for
emotional distress would be misguided. He thinks that it is a bad policy and
that the moral arguments in favor of compensating emotional distress are
weak. He cannot, however, simply apply this judgment to McLaughlin’s
case, because the previous decisions by which he is bound clearly reject his
8
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position by awarding damages. Nor may he simply hold that the previous
decisions were mistaken and that from now on no damages for emotional
distress will be awarded.14 Rather, Hercules must look at the previously
decided cases and construct the best possible argument that he can to
justify them. In justifying them, he looks not only at the outcomes in the
cases, but also to the reasons offered by the previous judges. He must
also account for these reasons, although in constructing the best possible
justiﬁcation for the previous cases he will necessarily recharacterize the
reasoning of previous judges. Thus the arguments in support of the
holdings evolve over time. In McLaughlin, Hercules would draw on the
best possible understanding that he has of policy and political morality
to justify the conclusion that those who witness the death of a loved one
should be compensated, and he would then decide if those arguments
justify giving the wife and mother of accident victims compensation when
she learns of the deaths in a hospital. Hercules’ interpretation involves
normative judgments, but it is not simply a matter of his normative
judgments. Rather, discovering what the law requires in a particular case
is a matter of giving force to the latent normative judgments of previous,
controlling precedents. Put another way, to discover the law in a “hard
case” a judge creates a story that makes sense of the clearly established
cases and then ﬁts the new case into that story in a way that places the
whole in the best possible light.
In my view, thinking of Church Doctrine as an analogous kind of
interpretation provides the best account of how we discover it. The
advantage of this view is that it does not require that we have any clear idea
about the rule of recognition. It simply requires that we have some easily
identiﬁable core cases of Church Doctrine from which we can reason.
This is precisely the situation in which we ﬁnd ourselves. We can easily
imagine that Brother Young and Sister Smith have very different opinions
about the rule of recognition for Church Doctrine. For example, Brother
Young might believe that Church Doctrine consists only of texts formally
canonized by a vote in general conference, while Sister Smith might regard
any public sermon by a member of the Quorum of the Twelve as Church
Doctrine. Both of them agree, however, that it is Church Doctrine that
Jesus Christ is the savior of mankind and that Latter-day Saints should not
drink coffee. When faced with a new question about Church Doctrine,
rather than trying to determine which of them has the correct rule of
recognition they can simply reason on the basis of clear cases, ﬁtting
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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the new question into a story that will place things in their best possible
light. More importantly, I think that this is how most Mormons actually
use the concept of Church Doctrine. To be sure, Latter-day Saints point
to authoritative statements in support of their claim that this or that
proposition or rule of conduct is Church Doctrine. However, all of these
claims are made against a background of teachings, experiences, and texts
that they seek to accommodate and charitably characterize. It is their
interpretation of the totality that produces their conclusions about what
is or is not Church Doctrine.
There are obviously important ways in which Church Doctrine as
integrity is different than law as integrity. A judge faced with a case does
not have the luxury of not resolving the question presented. Once the
parties have concluded the litigation, the judge is required to declare one
of the parties a winner. In centuries gone by a judge could rule dubitante,
simply declaring that the law was unclear and leaving the case undecided,
but this is no longer allowed. Accordingly, a jurisprudential theory requires
that the law be complete in the sense of providing some deﬁnitive answer
to any case that can be posed to it. Even in hard cases there are answers,
and the law is without gaps. Church Doctrine, however, doesn’t labor
under the same institutional imperatives as the law. Sometimes – often
– the best interpretation of Mormon texts, practices, and history will
be dubitante: We simply don’t know. Even here, however, the process of
interpretation will discipline our ignorance. Mormon texts, practices, and
history will foreclose certain answers even while they make other answers
more likely, all the while not deﬁnitively laying the matter to rest. Hence, on
some questions – such as the location of towns in the Virginia tidewater
– Church Doctrine is simply silent. On other questions, however, the
answer might be something like, “Well, under Church Doctrine there are
a couple of possible answers…”
For example, the precise meaning of the term “intelligence” as it is
used in the scriptures is notoriously vague. Bruce R. McConkie suggested
that “intelligence” consisted of some sort of pre-sentient stuff from
which spirits are organized.15 B. H. Roberts thought that “intelligences”
were the eternal, self-existent, self-aware core of the spirit that could
neither be created nor destroyed.16 Perhaps most esoterically, Orson
Pratt suggested that “intelligence” was an elemental ﬂuid of divinity that
pervaded to a greater and lesser extent the entire universe.17 (Blake Ostler
has recently articulated a philosophically sophisticated modern version of
10
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Pratt’s position.18) I take it that none of these positions can be identiﬁed
as the authoritative approach of Church Doctrine to the question. They
all ﬁt and justify Mormon texts, practices, and history to a greater or lesser
extent. On the other hand Church Doctrine does foreclose certain theories
of intelligence. For example, the consistent rejection of the doctrine of ex
nihilo creation by Mormon scriptures and authorities would foreclose the
idea that Church Doctrine can accommodate the view that “intelligence”
refers to some spirit substance created from nothing by God through an
act of divine ﬁat.
The question of whether Diet Coke is prohibited by the Word of
Wisdom provides an example of how we discover Church Doctrine. We
start with the brute fact that we all agree that the Word of Wisdom is
Church Doctrine and that it forbids drinking coffee, tea, and alcohol.
What would be the best story that one could tell about this? One story
would be to say that it is a health code designed to prohibit the ingestion
of bad substances.19 Thus we look at alcohol and caffeine and use them
as touchstones for Word of Wisdom compliance. On this view, chocolate
and Diet Coke, both of which contain caffeine, are out. There are a
number of problems with this interpretation. For example, the schedule
of prohibited substances is strangely random from a purely healthoriented point of view. Why condemn excessive meat consumption
but not excessive sugar consumption? Why explicitly include relatively
harmless substances like tea or coffee but not narcotics? One might offer
the argument that in the nineteenth century when Section 89 was given
they didn’t have such drugs. This, however, is historically inaccurate.
The nineteenth century was well acquainted with narcotics like opium.
Furthermore, the current interpretation of “hot drinks” as meaning tea
and coffee (but not herb tea) didn’t gel until the twentieth century, so it
is not clear why nineteenth-century practice should control. Given these
difﬁculties, one could conclude that the bad-substances interpretation
doesn’t provide the best account of the rules. A better account is that the
prohibition is meant as a reminder or symbol of the covenant that I make
with God and an open-ended admonition to be healthy. This explains
the seemingly arbitrary schedule of prohibited substances. As symbols
they are arbitrary in the same way that using the shape “A” to designate
the sound “ahhh” is arbitrary. It also explains the rise of the Word of
Wisdom as a central part of Mormon identity in the 1930s. As outward
reminders of Mormons’ status as a “peculiar people” in the form of
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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things like polygamy or the United Order retreated in the face of intense
outside pressure, the Word of Wisdom provided a workable mark of the
covenant. On this reading, however, the prohibition on hot drinks cannot
be reduced to a prohibition on caffeine that then extends to Diet Coke.
It does suggest, however, that one should avoid consumption – including
the consumption of Diet Coke – that is bad for one’s health.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHURCH DOCTRINE AS
INTEGRITY: HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

T

his interpretation of the Word of Wisdom may or may not be
correct, but it does illustrate how applying an interpretive approach
to the problem of Church Doctrine would work. This approach also casts
light on two persistent intellectual issues within Mormonism: historical
interpretation and the role of personal judgment in following Church
Doctrine. The Word of Wisdom example illustrates how an interpretive
approach makes sense of history and change in Church Doctrine. The
notion of Church Doctrine as a story whose totality must be accounted
for with a new chapter ﬁts in nicely with Mormon ideas of continuing
revelation (e.g. A. of F. 9) and with the reality of evolution in Mormon
thought. 20 The requirement that the story be told in the way that places
it in the best possible light also accounts for the persistent tendency of
Mormons to understand their own history in the rosiest possible terms.
Generally, this approach to Mormon history has been characterized as
simple apologetics and chalked up to naiveté or perhaps dishonesty.21
Seeing the discovery of Church Doctrine as an exercise in interpretation,
however, suggests that the goal of much of Mormon discussion of
history is neither history nor apologetics. Rather it is a search for what is
normative and what is not. In seeking to understand their past in the best
possible light, Mormons are trying to understand which parts of that past
have a claim on them and which parts do not. The stories function less
as historical explanations or even “faith promoting” narratives than as an
exercise in the discovery of Church Doctrine.
This is not meant as a historical apology for traditional Mormon history.
No doubt the search for the normative in Mormon history obscures
a great deal and creates a distorted view of the past. If our goal is to
understand fully – in so far as we are able – the nature of historical events,
then we will need to consider and offer interpretations that will not ﬁt into
12
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the narrative of Church Doctrine. Neither historical explanations nor the
doctrinal search for the normative in the Mormon past are illegitimate.
They are, however, different sorts of endeavors, although Mormons are
seldom clear – even in their own minds – about which exercise they are
engaged in.22 For example, the explanation for the twentieth-century
rise in the importance of the Word of Wisdom offered above uses the
interpretation of the past as a way of discovering the current contours
of normativity. It may or may not be an accurate or compelling historical
explanation. Indeed, it obscures things that a fully realized historical
explanation should consider. For example, a purely historical explanation
would take into account Heber J. Grant’s life-long afﬁliation with the
temperance movement and his failure to keep Utah from casting the
deciding vote to repeal Prohibition.23 It would also consider the role that
the economic imperatives of pioneer Utah played in the emphasis on the
Word of Wisdom.24 And so on. However, despite superﬁcial appearances,
my interpretation of the Word of Wisdom is not offered as a historical
account at all. Rather it is seeking to understand history only in a very
narrow and speciﬁc way, namely as a part of the current structure of
authoritative Church Doctrine. To paraphrase Dworkin:
[The discovery of Church Doctrine] begins in the present and
pursues the past only so far as and in the way its contemporary
focus dictates. It does not aim to recapture, even for present
[Church Doctrine], the ideals or practical purposes of the
[authorities] who ﬁrst created it. It aims rather to justify what they
did (sometimes including what they said) in an overall story worth
telling now, a story with a complex claim: that present practice can
be organized by and justiﬁed in principles sufﬁciently attractive to
provide an honorable future.25
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHURCH DOCTRINE AS
INTEGRITY: OBEDIENCE AND PERSONAL JUDGMENT

T

his approach also provides a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between individual judgment and following Church
Doctrine. To see how, we must understand that on this view Church
Doctrine is inherently contestable. This doesn’t mean that doctrinal
questions are without correct answers.26 Indeed the interpretive approach
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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necessarily assumes that many aspects of Church Doctrine are clear. Rather
it means that we always can have disagreements about certain aspects
of what Church Doctrine requires and that the only way of doctrinally
settling these disagreements will be by resort to complex arguments about
the best possible story to be told. It is important to understand that when
I say that certain aspects of Church Doctrine are inherently contestable, I
am not talking about disagreements over whether Church Doctrine is true
or whether it should be followed. Rather I am talking about disagreements
over the content of Church Doctrine itself. This inherent contestability is
illustrated by the fact that the Church’s solution to the practical problems
created by doctrinal disputes is not a clear and mechanical rule for
discovering what is Church Doctrine. We lack an intellectual formula for
escaping the demands of interpretation. Rather the coping mechanisms
are essentially moral and institutional.
Morally, we are to discuss Church Doctrine with charity and unity,
avoiding “contention.” In the Book of Mormon, the risen Christ teaches,
“For verily, verily I say unto you, he that hath the spirit of contention is
not of me, but is of the devil, who is the father of contention, and he
stirreth up the hearts of men to content with anger, one with another” (3
Ne. 11:28-29). This is not a philosophical Rosetta Stone that allows us to
transparently identify authoritative Church Doctrine. This fact suggests
that the primary danger of the contestability of Church Doctrine is not
epistemic. It is not that we will be mistaken. Rather, it is moral and social.
It is the danger of rancor, discord, and a loss of unity. Accordingly, we
have a solution in the form of a moral injunction about social interactions
– in this case doctrinal discussions – rather than an intellectual method for
resolving doctrinal disputes.
In addition to a morality of doctrinal discussion, we have institutional
solutions to the practical difﬁculties of doctrinal disagreements. Return
once again to the initial disagreement between Sister Smith and Brother
Young. Imagine that Sister Smith is called as a gospel doctrine teacher
and begins vociferously teaching her anti-evolution views during class.
Brother Young suggests to her that she should stop teaching her opinions
as Church Doctrine. Sister Smith indignantly replies that her views on
the age of the earth are Church Doctrine, insisting that she holds them
precisely for this reason. Both parties take the dispute to their bishop. He
asks that Sister Smith conﬁne her lesson more closely to the text of the
assigned scriptures. Such a solution to Sister Smith’s and Brother Young’s
14
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doctrinal disagreement is entirely institutional. Indeed, it needn’t take a
doctrinal position at all on the resolution of the dispute. The bishop’s
decision controls in this situation not because he has privileged access
to Church Doctrine per se but simply because he is the bishop. In this
sense, the hierarchy of the Church, with its accompanying notions of
stewardship and jurisdiction, renders a theory that incontestably identiﬁes
Church Doctrine unnecessary. 27 The success of the ethical and institution
methods of coping with doctrinal disagreement underscores the inherent
contestability of Church Doctrine. Given the proper attitude and
institutional structure, the contestability seems to be something that we
can live with. Nevertheless, the contestability remains.
The source of this inherent contestability lies in the fact that we can
only discover Church Doctrine by ﬁnding the best possible story that can
be told about the texts, practices, and history of Mormonism. Not only
is this process of interpretation complicated, but the principle of charity
means that it necessarily involves normative judgments that are inherently
contestable. This does not mean, however, that discovering Church
Doctrine is a free-wheeling exercise in normative reasoning. Such a view
fails to appreciate the difference between judging what would make the best
story about a particular set of phenomena and simply judging what would
be best. Discovering Church Doctrine requires that we make sense of
clear instances of Church Doctrine and their context (contemporary and
historical). This interpretive requirement forecloses certain possibilities.
For example, suppose that I come to believe – after careful consideration
– that the best way of memorializing gospel covenants in our lives would
be to eat only white food, since whiteness denotes purity and ingestion
is a powerful way of symbolizing how we take the gospel into our very
being. (Something like this view was common among early Christians.)
Whatever the merits of this practice, it is not Church Doctrine. It does
not purport to offer an interpretation of the teachings and practices of
the Church. In contrast, the interpretation of the Word of Wisdom that
I offered above assumes that the Word of Wisdom is an authority that
forecloses, for example, the modest and healthy consumption of wine.
The precise nature of the link between the authority of Church Doctrine
and the need to tell the best possible story about it is complicated. The
search for the best possible story is not offered as an account of the
authority of Church Doctrine. It does not aim at fully justifying it. Such a
justiﬁcation must come from elsewhere, and its nature is beyond the scope
Element Vol. 2 Issue 2 (Fall 2006)
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of this essay.28 Sufﬁce it to say that the source of the authority of Church
Doctrine likely lies in covenants, priesthood power, the privileged access of
prophets to the divine, and the needs of the saints as a community. These
are all normative grounds separate from the particular stories that we tell
about particular doctrines. (Although to be sure, the grounds of Church
Doctrine’s authority no doubt have their role to play in understanding this
or that question about its contours.) However, the authority of Church
Doctrine does require that we look at it in the best possible light. Such an
approach acknowledges that Church Doctrine is something with a claim
upon us, something normative.
Hence, following Church Doctrine does not constitute an abdication
of independent moral judgment, as has been so often suggested.
Following Church Doctrine does mean subordinating one’s independent
substantive judgments on an issue to which Church Doctrine speaks. Yet
understanding what Church Doctrine requires is not a mechanical process.
Acknowledging the authority of Church Doctrine means committing
oneself to discovering its demands. Yet this process of discovery will
necessarily involve making independent judgments about what provides
the best possible story to be told about the totality of known doctrines.
Put another way, independent of its legitimacy or justiﬁcation, discovering
the bounds of authority is at least in part a normative inquiry that requires
our independent judgment. Even in obedience we “must be as gods,
knowing good and evil” (Moses 4:11).29
CONCLUSION

M

y goal in this essay has not been to reform or critique the way that
Mormons use the concept of Church Doctrine. Rather, I have tried
to elucidate what I take to be the underlying logic of their practice. Hence,
the interpretive approach that I draw by analogy from the philosophy of
law is not offered as something new. Rather, I think that on this point
Mormons are rather like the man who discovers that he has been speaking
prose all his life. Analogizing the question of how we know if something
is Church Doctrine to the question of how we know if something is law,
however, does allow us to bring certain issues into sharper focus. First,
it allows us to recognize that we lack a rule of recognition for what is
Church Doctrine. Second, it provides us with a way of understanding why
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this is not a serious theoretical objection to our current practice. Finally,
by revealing the inherently interpretive nature of discovering Church
Doctrine, it hopefully sheds light on some of our other institutional and
theoretical practices.
Nathan B. Oman is Assistant Professor at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at
The College of William & Mary
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